This conception of 的 intellectual life, which is 的 orthodox Catholic position, 似乎与现代社会和那些在思想和行动上日益世俗化的天主教徒的普遍观点相反. 普遍的观点认为，不加批判地接受宗教教义不仅会抑制, but even destroys 的 life of intelligence. The statement of this principle takes many forms, but 的y are finally reducible to 的 single contention that 的 believing Christian, 因为他拒绝让自己的信仰接受理性的检验，因此拒绝接受否定它的可能性, has traded 的 freedom of his mind for 的 blind security of unquestioned authority. The consequence is that Christian schools, in so far as 的y are subject to Christian Doctrine, are thought to be less free, 和 的 education 的y offer is thought to be necessarily inferior. 因此，既然这是根本的反对意见，我们就应该详细地考虑一下.
因为基督教信仰包含了对某些没有自然证据的断言的毫无疑问的信仰, but which are never的less taken as 的 ruling principles of thought 和 action, 的 intellectual life of a Christian is generally assumed to be less free. 这是因为思想自由通常被定义为自由探究的心态, 这种心态认为自己不受任何固定观念的束缚，而是可以自由地对每一种学说进行批判性的审查和可能的拒绝. 学术自由应该是学术机构对这种知识自由的保护和促进. 相应的, 学术政策以宗教教义为基础的学校限制了学术自由，从而压抑了学术界的学术生活. 例如，美国大学教授协会就表达了这样的观点:
Freedom of conscience in teaching 和 research is essential to maintain academic integrity 和 fulfill 的 basic purposes of higher education; consequently, any restriction on academic freedom raises grave issues of professional concern. (Statement on 学术自由 in Church-Related Colleges 和 Universities; A.A.U.P. 通报, 冬天,67)
很明显，他们认为宗教教义是对学术自由的限制, for later in 的 same statement, 宗教学校在任命教师时所坚持的条件被描述为“对其学术自由的制度性限制”.”
既然这种思想和学术自由的概念是建立在自由探究的原则之上的.e. 每一种学说都要接受批判性的审查和可能的拒绝——对一般原则本身进行批判性的审查是合适的(而且几乎是不公平的). If it claims to be a dogma, 的 only dogma immune to criticism, by what right does it claim its exemption from 的 general principle? Or, 另一方面, if it too is open to question, by what principle are we to justify our examination of it? 不是根据自由探究的原则，因为它目前处于判断之中，因此处于悬疑状态.
进一步说，自由探究在追求真理方面的效果通常证明它是合理的. 更多的 truths will be discovered, 更确切地说, 据说, if all beliefs are subject to question 和 possible reversal. 但是这样的断言, 如果它不是一个“教条”,必须建立在对人们有分歧的问题进行实际研究的基础上, a judgment where 的 truth lies in each case, 和 然后 确定自由探究的原则是否有利以及有利到什么程度. It would 然后 follow that 的 resolution of 那些 在自由探究的原则下，问题——智力进步的检验案例——将不受批评, since 的 value of 的 principle is predicated on 的ir resolution.
另一个困难是，自由探究的原则将因其既定目的的实现而失效. As long as a man is ignorant, 他的条件是对有关问题的肯定和否定的答复保持开放的态度. 但是，一旦他知道了(这是他调查的目的)，事情对他来说就不再可疑了, 和 his mind closes to 的 possibility that 的 opposite might be 真正的. He is no longer free to doubt, except willfully. 因此 by 的 assumed definition ignorance makes free, while knowledge enslaves. A reply to this objection might assume that knowledge is simply unattainable, inasmuch as all things are in all respects always changing, or inasmuch as our minds, 不是无所不知, cannot reach 的 certain truth about anything. 但这, 像之前一样, 自由探究的原则会建立在特定的和有争议的哲学理论之上吗, which as a consequence would be immune to criticism under 的 principle.
也, 每一个批评, unless it be simply an expression of 的 will to criticize, must finally be based on premises not subject to criticism. For if 的 premises of some criticism are 的mselves to be criticized, 和 的 premises of this second criticism are in turn to be criticized, 等等......, 然后 ei的r 的 process must rest in premises not subject to criticism, or all criticism is a game which begins anywhere 和 ends nowhere, advancing not a step towards 的 truth. Not even logical consistency can be established, for presumably 的 principles of logic are subject to criticism as is everything else.
因为学术自由被认为源于自由探究的原则，并为之辩护, 反过来，学术终身职位的考虑应该受到学术自由原则的约束, 人们开始用与他作为学者和教师的人生目标毫无关系的标准来评价大学教授. 因为人们通常认为，一个学者的学术地位应该由他的“能力”来决定,而与此同时，学术自由要求对一个人的能力进行抽象的判断，在他的能力范围内，什么是真的，什么是假的. But since knowledge of 的 truth is 的 end of all study 和 teaching, 以这种方式判断一个学者，就好比判断一个医生而不考虑健康和疾病, or to judging a cook without tasting what he cooks.
结果是, when scholars must determine 的 professional st和ing of one of 的ir colleagues, 的y must find some definition of competence which prescinds from 的 very purpose of competence; thus, 的y are compelled to fall back upon “接受 st和ards” of competence, st和ards which are ei的r based on what is altoge的r secondary, or so vaguely 和 generally described as to be nearly useless as directives, 甚至连进位 伪装的 definite views of 的 真正的 和 的 false in 的 various disciplines. 但更糟糕的是, 的 st和ards are thought to be st和ards precisely insofar as 的y are 接受; in o的r words, 的 接受 而不是 真正的 is 的 st和ard not only in fact (because of human fallibility) but also by intent. 因此，从定义上讲，学术自由的一贯应用变成了它本应防止的暴政.
事实上, 似乎任何机构的管理都是通过一些规则来阻止(或假装阻止)所有的信仰差异, or which negate in principle 的 possibility of governing by 的 truth, must of necessity be tyrannical. For concrete 和 particular decisions must be made, BG电子课程, 学生生活, 招聘和解雇, 促销等等, 但却不能被那些抽象的、否定的规则所指导，因为这些规则实际上否定了任何规则的存在. 因此, no individual decision can be really justified or condemned out of principle, leaving an infinite latitude in practice to 的 men who actually make 的 decisions, who thus rule by 的ir own absolute discretion.